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AN ANALYSIS OF FEE SHIFTING BASED ON 
THE MARGIN OF VICTORY: ON FRIVOLOUS 
SUITS, MERITORIOUS SUITS, AND THE ROLE 
OF RULE 11 
LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK and HOWARD F. CHANG* 
ABSTRACT 
When plaintiffs cannot predict the outcome of litigation with certainty, neither 
the American rule (each litigant bears its own litigation expenses) nor the British 
rule (the losing litigant pays the attorneys' fees of the winning litigant) would 
induce optimal decisions to bring suit. Plaintiffs may bring frivolous suits when 
litigation costs are small relative to the amount at stake; plaintiffs may not bring 
meritorious suits when litigation costs are large relative to this amount. More 
general fee-shifting rules are based not only on the identity of the winning party 
but also on how strong the court perceives the case to be at the end of the trial 
(the "margin of victory"). We analyze when such a rule can induce plaintiffs to 
sue if and only if they believe their cases are sufficiently strong. We explore the 
implications of our analysis for the use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
UNDER fee-shifting rules a court can require the losing litigant to pay 
the attorneys' fees of the winning litigant. Although there exists a sub-
stantial literature on the economic analysis of such fee-shifting rules, the 
assumption throughout has been that fee shifting will depend only on the 
identity of the winning party. This article contributes to that literature by 
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considering the effect of fee-shifting rules that are based not only on 
which party won the case but also on how strong the court perceives the 
plaintiff's case to be at the end of the trial-that is, the "margin of 
victory.'' In particular, we analyze how expanding the set of instruments 
available to courts can provide better incentives for a plaintiff to bring 
suit. This analysis reveals how and when one can design such a rule to 
induce plaintiffs to sue only if they believe their cases are sufficiently 
strong. 1 
This analysis of fee-shifting rules based on the margin of victory is not 
only of theoretical interest but also of practical significance: as we will 
discuss in Section VII, courts have interpreted Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 as an example of such a rule. In order to deter parties 
from filing frivolous papers in court, Rule 11 authorizes courts to impose 
sanctions on those who file such papers. Typically, a court uses Rule 11 
against the plaintiff when it determines that the plaintiff's claims are so 
lacking in merit that they are frivolous; the sanction that courts have 
imposed most frequently is an order that the plaintiff pay the defendant's 
attorney's fees. Our analysis will produce conclusions that shed light on 
the role :hat Rule 11 can play in improving the plaintiff's incentives to 
bring suit. 2 
Suppose that society seeks to induce plaintiffs to sue if and only if they 
believe they are entitled to prevail at trial. (As discussed in Section VI, 
the analysis of this article is more general, that is, also allows for other 
objectives.) This objective implies two goals: that a plaintiff bring a "mer-
itorious" suit-which we define as a suit that deserves to win on the 
merits, as the plaintiff views the case-and that a plaintiff not bring a 
"frivolous" suit-which we define as a suit that does not deserve to win 
on the merits, as the plaintiff views the case. How can fee-shifting rules 
best serve these goals? 3 
1 For our purposes, we will treat the plaintiff and its attorneys as one actor. That is, we 
do not introduce principal-agent problems between each party and its attorneys. 
2 Although we will describe our analysis in terms of a plaintiff's incentives to bring suit, 
the model also generalizes to apply to any party's incentives to file any paper, with fee 
shifting based on the costs of litigating the merits of that paper and on the margin of victory 
on that particular issue. Thus, our analysis extends to the use of Rule 11 sanctions in these 
other contexts, including the use of sanctions against the defendant. The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure also provide other examples of fee shifting based on the margin of victory. 
For example, Rule 37(a)(4) requires a court to award attorney's fees to the winning party 
on a motion for an order compelling disclosure or discovery, unless a losing party ''was 
substantially justifieS}" in making the motion (in the case of a losing movant) or in opposing 
the disclosure or discovery (in the case of a winning movant). 
3 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic 
Analysis, 82 Geo. L. J. 397 (1993), and A. Mitchell Polinsky & DanielL. Rubinfeld, Optimal 
Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies among Plaintiffs, 27 RAND 
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One important consideration is the fact that the outcome of a trial is 
unlikely to be certain to the plaintiff when it decides whether to sue. One 
source of uncertainty is that the court might lack information available 
to the plaintiff or can err in its judgment given the information that it can 
observe. Furthermore, the plaintiff might lack information that a trial 
would later reveal to the court. As a result, the plaintiff might attach 
some probability to winning even if it views its case as weak, and it might 
attach some probability to losing even if it views its case as strong. 4 
Consider first the standard American rule, under which each litigant 
bears its own expenses. This rule does not induce optimal litigation deci-
sions. First, plaintiffs will not bring all meritorious suits. Even if the 
plaintiff can count on the court to decide the case as the plaintiff predicts, 
the plaintiff will not sue if its litigation costs exceed the value of the relief 
that it expects the court to award. Second, if the plaintiff believes that 
the court's decision might differ from what the plaintiff expects' either 
because the court might err or because the plaintiff might err, then as we 
will show, the plaintiff will bring some frivolous suits. If the litigation 
costs are small enough, the plaintiff will find it worthwhile to gamble-
either because the court might err in the plaintiff's favor or because the 
case might prove to be better than it first appears. 
Consider next the British rule, under which the loser pays the expenses 
of the winner. If the plaintiff could predict the trial outcome without 
error, then the plaintiff would not bring a frivolous suit and would never 
be discouraged by litigation expenses from bringing a meritorious suit, 
which would guarantee the plaintiff reimbursement of its litigation ex-
penses. If the plaintiff cannot predict the trial outcome with certainty, 
however, then as we will show, the plaintiff will not always make litiga-
tion decisions consistent with the goals suggested above. First, if litiga-
tion costs are small enough, then the plaintiff will bring some frivolous 
suits because it might win at trial anyway. Second, if litigation costs are 
sufficiently large, then the prospect of losing (and bearing the expenses 
of both litigants) will deter the plaintiff from bringing some meritorious 
suits because it still might lose at trial. 
J. Econ. 269 (1996), examine how awards and sanctions can discourage frivolous suits and 
encourage meritorious suits. Polinsky and Rubinfeld do not, however, consider the subject 
that is the main focus of this article: how fee shifting based on the margin of victory can 
advance these goals. Whereas we focus on the criteria courts might use in deciding whether 
or not to shift fees, Polinsky and Rubinfeld focus on the magnitudes of awards and sanctions 
as policy instruments. 
4 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to 
Obey the Law, 5 J. L. Ecun. & Org. 99 (1989), stressed the important effect of legal 
uncertainty caused by judicial error on the incentive to sue. Polinsky and Shavell do not 
study, however, how fee shifting based on the margin of victory can address the problem 
of judicial error (and other reasons for the unpredictability of judgment). 
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This article shows how to design fee-shifting rules so as to induce better 
litigation decisions. The fee shifting should depend not only on which 
party prevails but also on the margin by which they prevailed. That is, 
the rule should take into account not only who won but also the degree 
to which they won easily. This information is useful because a plaintiff 
who loses by a large margin is less likely to have believed ex ante that 
the case was meritorious than a plaintiff who loses by a small margin. 
Similarly, a plaintiff who wins by a large margin is less likely to have 
believed ex ante that the case was frivolous than a plaintiff who wins by 
a small margin. 
Given the distribution of the errors in the plaintiff's prediction of the 
trial outcome, it is possible to design a fee-shifting rule that would induce 
better litigation decisions. Because the optimal rule depends on this distri-
bution,. a court can implement such a rule as long as it has some sense 
of how these errors are distributed. This article examines the structure 
of such rules and how they affect litigation decisions, then applies our 
conclusions to Rule 11 as it exists today. 
Section II of this article presents the formal model of litigation that we 
shall use to analyze the plaintiff's incentives to bring suit. Section III 
examines those incentives under the classic fee-shifting rules, which allo-
cate litigation costs according to the identity of the losing party. In Sec-
tion IV, we allow the fee-shifting rule to depend on the margin of victory 
as well, and we show how one can thereby provide the plaintiff with 
better incentives to bring suit. Section V shows that if the court can shift 
the fees of either litigant in each case, then there exists a whole family 
of such fee-shifting rules that can present plaintiffs with these improved 
incentives. Section VI explores some extensions of our model. Section 
VII considers the implications of our analysis for the application of Rule 
11. Section VIII summarizes our conclusions. 
II. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
Consider a potential plaintiff who is deciding whether to bring suit 
against a potential defendant. Let x be the parameter relevant for de-
termining the merits of the plaintiff's suit (or an index that summarizes 
all the relevant parameters). Without loss of generality, we can define x 
such that the plaintiff's case is stronger, and the defendant's case is 
correspondingly weaker, as x increases. In particular, let x represent the 
threshold value for a victory for the plaintiff: the court will decide in 
favor of the plaintiff if and only if the court finds that x exceeds x. 
This framework is general enough to describe the situation under a 
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wide variety of rules setting forth the standard of liability. For example, 
the defendant's liability in a particular tort suit might depend on whether 
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, in which case x would represent 
the amount by which the plaintiff's level of care exceeded the standard 
for negligence, and x would equal zero. Or the case might turn on whether 
the defendant was negligent, in which case x would represent the amount 
by which the defendant's actual level of care fell short of the standard of 
due care (that is, the extent of the defendant's underinvestment in safety 
precautions), and x would equal zero. Or the case might turn on an issue 
of causation, and x might be a feature that determines whether the court 
will find proximate cause. 
Let xc denote the value of x observed by the court and thus the value 
of x on which the court bases its judgment. An important feature of our 
model is that the court may not be able to identify x accurately. Specifi-
cally, except in Section IliA, we assume that the court errs by a random 
amount E, so that xc = x + E. The random variable E is distributed 
according to a cumulative distribution function F(e). For any particular 
realization of e, e', the corresponding F(e') will equal the probability ex 
ante that E s e'. Let e take on positive and negative values, each with 
some positive probability, so that 0 < F(O) < 1. For simplicity, assume 
that E only takes on values within the interval (- e 1, e2), where both e 1 
and e2 are positive, and let F(e) be continuous and strictly increasing 
over this interval. Let F- 1 denote the inverse function of F(e), defined 
over the domain [0, 1] such that F- 1(0) = -e 1 and F- 1(1) = e2 • 
Let ep denote the probability that E > 0, that is, the likelihood that the 
court will err in favor of the plaintiff, so that 0 P = 1 - F(O). Accordingly, 
OP is the likelihood that a defendant who just barely deserves to win on 
the merits (that is, a defendant in the marginal case in which x = x) will 
nevertheless lose because the court errs in favor of the plaintiff. Let Oct 
denote the probability that e s 0, that is, the likelihood that the court 
will not err in favor of the plaintiff, so that Oct = F(O). Accordingly, Oct is 
the likelihood that the defendant in the marginal case (in which x = x) 
will win. 
The case in which Oct = OP = 1h will prove to be a useful example. 
This case is symmetric insofar as the court is as likely to decide the 
marginal case in favor of the defendant as it is in favor of the plaintiff: 
the court is as likely to overestimate the strength of the plaintiff's case 
as it is to underestimate it. Our framework is not limited to the symmetric 
case, however, and covers also those cases in which the court systemati-
cally errs in favor of one side. 
The plaintiff expects the court to require the defendant to pay the 
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plaintiff some amount if the court finds the defendant liable. Let D denote 
the expected award conditional on a finding of liability, where D > 0. 5 
(For example, in a tort case, D is the expected amount of damages that 
the court would award to the plaintiff if the defendant is found liable.) 
We assume that D, the expected amount at stake, is independent of Xc· 
If D is instead a function of x, then the D(xc) function is another policy 
instrument, which we consider as an extension of our model in Section 
VIC. Let CP and Cct be the litigation costs of the plaintiff and of the 
defendant, respectively' where cp > 0 and cd > 0. 
Let xP be the plaintiff's observation of x when deciding whether to 
bring suit. At this stage, we assume that the plaintiff knows the true value 
of x; that is, xP = x. Therefore, xc = xP + E. Section VIA explains how 
the analysis can be extended easily to the case in which the plaintiff is 
imperfectly informed about x. In particular, the court may have informa-
tion available at trial that is unavailable to the plaintiff when deciding 
whether to bring suit. 
The plaintiff is risk neutral. For simplicity, we assume that the plaintiff 
sues if and only if the expected value of bringing the suit and going to 
trial is positive. 6 The court observes xc before reaching judgment and 
also knows D, F(E), CP' and Cct when it applies the fee-shifting rule. 
When the plaintiff decides whether to sue, it knows x P, D, F( E), C P, C d, 
and the fee-shifting rule. 
Suppose that the social objective is to induce the plaintiff to sue if and 
only if xP > x*, where x* is some threshold. This general statement of 
the objective is reasonable: we cannot have the plaintiff act on anything 
but its impression of its case, and presumably if we want to deter suits 
for a certain value of xP, we also want to deter suits for any lower values. 
At this stage, we assume that x* = x. That is, the plaintiff should sue if 
and only if the plaintiff believes that the defendant is liable. Thus, to get 
optimal decisions to bring suit, the expected value of going to trial must 
5 This model also generalizes to include suits in which the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, 
if we let D include the expected value of this relief to the plaintiff. 
6 If parties can settle before going to trial, then plaintiffs might find it worthwhile to bring 
suits with negative expected value, solely to extract a settlement offer. See Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. Legal Stud. 437 (1988); Lucian 
A. Bebchuk, A New Theory concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 
25 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1996); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits 
Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 3 (1985). Plaintiffs will 
bring every suit with positive expected value, whether or not settlements are possible. 
Thus, the possibility of settlements raises the incentives for plaintiffs to sue, compared with 
a model that excludes settlements. Although our model does not necessarily preclude the 
possibility of settlements, our simplifying assumption does preclude plaintiffs from bringing 
suits when litigating to judgment is not worthwhile. 
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be nonpositive for any xP ::s x and positive for any xP > x. Section VIB 
shows how the analysis can be adjusted for the case in which x* does 
not equal x. 
Ill. FEE-SHIFTING RuLES BASED ON THE WINNER's IDENTITY 
In this section, we shall examine the effects of the classic fee-shifting 
rules, under which fee shifting, to the extent that it occurs, depends only 
on the identity of the winning party. 7 Each of the classic fee-shifting rules 
provides an important benchmark for comparison with fee-shifting rules 
that can depend on the margin of victory. 
A. Judgment Predicted with Certainty 
In this section we assume that xc = xP, so that the plaintiff can predict 
the judgment with certainty. That is, E is not a random variable. Instead, 
E = 0 in each case. 
The American Rule. When the plaintiff can predict the court's judg-
ment with certainty, the American rule would discourage all frivolous 
suits but may fail to encourage all meritorious suits. Specifically, under 
the American rule, the plaintiff will sue if and only if both x P > x and 
CP <D. A plaintiff will never bring a frivolous suit, because a case with 
x P ::s x would be bound to lose. Thus, the plaintiff would recover nothing 
and would be saddled with its own litigation costs. A plaintiff might fail 
to bring a meritorious suit, however, if its litigation costs are sufficiently 
large. Even a winning suit, with xP > x, would not be worthwhile if 
C P > D, because the plaintiff would not recover enough to pay its litiga-
tion costs. 
The British Rule. When the plaintiff can predict the court's judgment 
with certainty, the British rule would discourage all frivolous suits and 
encourage all meritorious suits. Specifically, under the British rule, the 
plaintiff will sue if and only if xP > x. Without uncertainty over the trial 
outcome, this rule yields the optimal incentives for the plaintiff. A plain-
tiff will never bring a frivolous suit, because it would be bound to lose. 
Thus, the plaintiff would recover no damages and bear at least its own 
litigation costs. A plaintiff will always bring a meritorious suit, because 
it would be bound to win, and in this case the plaintiff would not have 
to bear its own litigation costs. 
The Pro-Defendant Rule. Under the pro-defendant rule, each litigant 
pays its own costs if the defendant loses, but the plaintiff pays the defen-
7 See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alterna-
tive Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55 (1982). 
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dant's costs if the defendant wins. Like the American rule, the pro-
defendant rule would discourage all frivolous suits but may fail to encour-
age all meritorious suits: under conditions of certainty, the plaintiff will 
sue if and only if both xP > x and CP <D. The pro-defendant rule is no 
improvement over the American rule. The pro-defendant rule can penal-
ize plaintiffs that bring losing suits, but under conditions of certainty, 
plaintiffs will not bring such suits under the American rule anyway. 
The Pro-Plaintiff Rule. Under the pro-plaintiff rule, each litigant pays 
its own costs if the plaintiff loses, but the defendant pays the plaintiff's 
costs if the plaintiff wins. Like the British rule, the pro-plaintiff rule 
would both discourage all frivolous suits and encourage all meritorious 
suits: under conditions of certainty, the plaintiff will sue if and only if 
xP > x. The pro-plaintiff rule is an improvement over the American rule. 
The prqblem under the American rule is a failure to encourage all merito-
rious suits, and the pro-plaintiff rule addresses this problem by relieving 
the winning plaintiff of its litigation costs. 
B. Judgment Predicted with Uncertainty 
In this section we assume that xc = xP + E, where E is a random 
variable. Thus, the plaintiff cannot predict the trial outcome with cer-
tainty. As we shall see, none of the classic rules can guarantee that the 
plaintiff will have optimal incentives in all cases. Under each rule, plain-
tiffs bring some frivolous suits and fail to bring some meritorious suits. 
The American Rule. Under the American rule, the plaintiff will sue 
if and only if 
(1) 
Substituting xP + E for xc in (1), we find this condition is equivalent to 
(2) 
Thus, if CP ~ D, then (2) cannot hold, and the plaintiff will never sue. If 
CP < D, however, the plaintiff will sue if and only if xP is greater than 
some threshold value, which we shall denote ass*. This s* is defined by 
1 - F(i- s*) = CPID, 
or, equivalently, 
s* = i- p- 1[1 - (C/D)]. (3) 
The plaintiff will have optimal incentives if and only if it is just indiffer-
ent about bringing the marginal suit (in which xP = x), that is, if s* = x. 
Thus, (3) implies that the American rule will lead to optimal incentives 
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for the plaintiff if and only if 1 - F(O) = C P/ D. Recall that 1 F(O) 
equals eP, the probability that the court will view the plaintiff's case more 
favorably than the plaintiff does, which is therefore also the probability 
that a case with xP = x would succeed. 
As in the case of prediction with certainty, this rule might discourage 
a plaintiff from bringing a meritorious suit if the plaintiff's litigation costs 
are sufficiently large relative to the amount at stake. The possibility that 
even a meritorious suit can lose, however, aggravates this problem. Spe-
cifically, if eP < CP/ D, then too little litigation results. In these cases, 
either CP ~ D or s* > x, and the plaintiff will be discouraged from 
bringing some meritorious suits because C P would be too large relative 
to D. 
Once we allow for prediction with uncertainty, moreover, it is no 
longer true that this rule would discourage all frivolous suits. The plaintiff 
might bring a frivolous suit if the plaintiff's litigation costs are sufficiently 
small relative to the amount at stake, because even a frivolous suit might 
prevail. Specifically, if eP > C/D, then too much litigation results. In 
these cases, s* < x, and the plaintiff would bring some frivolous suits, 
because the likelihood of favorable judgments in these cases would be 
sufficiently high. 
For example, consider the case in which the court is as likely to err in 
favor of the defendant as it is to err in favor of the plaintiff: ed = ep = 
1/z. In this case, if CP < 1/zD, then there will be too much litigation. If 
CP > 1/zD instead, then there will be too little litigation. 
The British Rule. Whereas the British rule ensures optimal incentives 
to sue under conditions of certainty, it no longer does so under conditions 
of uncertainty. By the same reasoning we applied to the American rule, 
we can show that under the British rule and conditions of uncertainty, 
the plaintiff will sue if and only if xP is greater than some s*, which is 
defined by 
(4) 
Thus, this rule will lead to optimal incentives for the plaintiff if and only 
if eP = (CP + Cct)I(D + CP + Cct)· 
This rule might discourage a plaintiff from bringing a meritorious suit 
if the parties' litigation costs are sufficiently large relative to the amount 
at stake, because even a meritorious suit might lose. Specifically, if eP < 
(CP + Cct)I(D + CP + Cct), then too little litigation results. In these 
cases, s* > x, and the plaintiff will be discouraged from bringing some 
meritorious suits because the costs that it would bear in the event that 
the suit loses, CP + Cd, will be sufficiently large relative to the gain in 
the event the suit wins, D. 
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Furthermore, this rule might encourage a plaintiff to bring a frivolous 
suit if the plaintiff's litigation costs are sufficiently small, because even 
a frivolous suit might prevail. Specifically, if ep > (Cp + Cd)/(D + CP 
+ Cd), then too much litigation results. In these cases, s* < x, and the 
plaintiff will bring some frivolous suits, because the likelihood of favor-
able judgments in these cases would be sufficiently high. 8 
For example, consider the case in which the court is as likely to err in 
favor of the defendant as it is to err in favor of the plaintiff: ed = eP = 
1h. In this case, if cp + cd < D, then there will be too much litigation. 
If CP + Cd > D instead, then there will be too little litigation. 
The Pro-Defendant Rule. By similar reasoning, we can show that 
under the pro-defendant rule, if CP ~ D, then the plaintiff would never 
sue. If C P < D instead, however, then the plaintiff will sue if and only if 
xP is g~eater than some s*, which is defined by 
s* = x- p- 1[1 - (Cp + Cd)/(D + Cd)]. (5) 
Thus, this rule will lead to optimal incentives for the plaintiff if and only 
if eP = (Cp + Cd)/(D + Cd). If instead eP < (Cp + Cd)/(D + Cd), then 
too little litigation results. On the other hand, if eP > (CP + Cd)/(D + 
Cd), then too much litigation results. 9 
The Pro-Plaintiff Rule. By similar reasoning, we can show that under 
the pro-plaintiff rule, the plaintiff will sue if and only if xP is greater than 
some s*, which is defined by 
(6) 
Thus, this rule will lead to optimal incentives for the plaintiff if and only 
8 Note that once we allow for prediction with uncertainty, it is no longer clear whether 
the British rule or the American rule offers the plaintiff the greater incentive to sue. That 
is, between the British rule and the American rule, it is ambiguous which rule implies the 
lower threshold s*. Comparing (3) and (4), we find that the incentive is greater under the 
British rule if and only if 
CP/Cd > D/(Cp + Cd). 
For example, in the case in which the litigation costs of the two parties are equal, C = 
Cd, the British rule offers the plaintiff greater incentives to sue than the American rufe if 
the total litigation costs exceed the amount at stake but smaller incentives if the amount at 
stake exceeds total litigation costs. 
9 For example, consider the case in which eP = 1h. In this case, if CP + Cd < lfz(D + 
Cd), then there will be too much litigation. If CP + Cd > 1h(D + Cd) instead, then there 
will be too little litigation. 
If CP < D, then the pro-defendant rule offers the plaintiff less incentive to sue than either 
the American rule or the British rule: we can see from (5) that the pro-defendant rule implies 
a thresholds* that is strictly larger than those under the American and British rules. If CP 
;:::: D instead, then the incentive to sue would be equally small under the American rule and 
under the pro-defendant rule: in this case, the plaintiff would never sue under either rule. 
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ifeP = C/(D + CP). If instead eP < C/(D + CP), then too little litigation 
results. On the other hand, if eP > CP/(D + CP), then too much litigation 
results. 10 
IV. THE OPTIMAL ONE-SIDED FEE-SHIFTING RULE 
Until now we have examined rules under which, if there is fee shifting 
at all, it can only depend on the identity of the winner, that is, on whether 
xc > x. In this section we drop this constraint on the structure of the 
fee-shifting rules. We allow the courts to take into account the margin of 
victory, that is, we allow the fee-shifting rule to be based on the difference 
between x c and x. 
In this section, we will limit ourselves to one-sided fee-shifting rules, 
under which, for a given D, F(e), CP, and Cd, there may be fee shifting 
only in favor of one side, throughout the domain of xc. We will consider 
two-sided fee shifting in the next section. As we will show, to design 
the best one-sided fee-shifting rule, it is helpful to distinguish between 
situations in which the American rule provides inadequate incentives to 
sue and those in which it provides excessive incentives to sue. 
A. Insufficient Incentive to Litigate under the American Rule 
If eP < C/D, then the American rule leads to insufficient incentives 
to bring suit. Under these circumstances, the American rule discourages 
all frivolous suits but also discourages some meritorious suits. In this 
case, pro-plaintiff fee shifting can improve the plaintiff's incentives to 
sue: 
PROPOSITION 1. If eP < CPID, then the best one-sided fee-shifting rule 
would specify that the defendant pays the plaintiff's litigation costs if 
Xc > Yp, where 
(7) 
This rule would provide optimal results: it would both discourage all 
frivolous suits and encourage all meritorious suits. 
Proof See the Appendix. 
Intuition. Under the American rule, a plaintiff with xP equal to x will 
expect to win 6PD from going to trial at a cost of CP. If CP > 6PD' then 
10 For example, consider the case in which e = 112. In this case, if CP < 1h(D + CP), 
then there will be too much litigation. If CP > t/'2(D + Cp) instead, then there will be too 
little litigation. 
The incentive to sue is the greatest under the pro-plaintiff rule insofar as (6) implies that 
the threshold s* is the lowest under this rule. That is, the pro-plaintiff rule implies a thresh-
old s* that is strictly smaller than that under any of the other classic fee-shifting rules. 
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the plaintiff's suit has negative expected value not only for xP = x but 
also for some xP slightly greater than x. If the plaintiff's litigation costs 
can be shifted to the defendant with probability close to 1, which we can 
accomplish with a sufficiently small y P, then the plaintiff can obtain posi-
tive expected value from bringing the same cases. Because we can vary 
y P continuously, we can find an intermediate value for y P such that the 
expected value of bringing suit will be exactly 0 for the marginal case, in 
which xP = x. 
Comparative Statics. Note that the plaintiff's expected payoff from 
bringing the marginal suit is strictly increasing in eP and D but does not 
depend on Cct· Furthermore, as long as 0 < F(YP - x) < 1, so that fee 
shifting is possible but not certain in the marginal case, this payoff will 
strictly decrease in Yp and CP. 11 Thus, as long as the fee-shifting rule sets 
Yp to optimize the plaintiff's incentives to bring suit such that x - e 1 < 
Yp < x + e2 , the optimal Yp will strictly increase in eP and D but strictly 
decrease in C P. 
That is, ceteris paribus, the optimal policy becomes more pro-
defendant if either eP or D increases but more pro-plaintiff if CP increases. 
If the award that the plaintiff expects to recover increases, then the opti-
mal rule-to offset the increased incentive to bring suit-must decrease 
the probability that the defendant would have to bear the plaintiff's litiga-
tion costs. If on the other hand, these litigation costs increase, then the 
optimal rule-to offset the reduced incentive to bring suit-must de-
crease the probability that the plaintiff would have to bear them. 
Comparison with the Classic Pro-Plaintiff Rule. As we saw in Section 
IIIB, the classic pro-plaintiff rule, which imposes the constraint Yp = x, 
is optimal if and only if eP = CP/(D + CP). In this section, we see that 
if Cp/(D + Cp) < ep < CPID, then the classic pro-plaintiff rule leads to 
too much litigation, and the best rule instead sets Yp higher than x. In 
order to trigger pro-plaintiff fee shifting under the best rule, the plaintiff 
must not only win its case but also win by a sufficiently wide margin. If 
eP < C/(D + CP) instead, then the classic pro-plaintiff rule leads to too 
little litigation, and y P < x is necessary to increase the plaintiff's incen-
tives. The best fee-shifting rule in these cases is even more pro-plaintiff 
than the classic pro-plaintiff fee-shifting rule: the plaintiff wins reimburse-
ment not only when it wins its case but also when it loses its case by a 
sufficiently small margin. 
Fee Shifting in Favor of Winning Plaintiffs Only. Suppose we impose 
11 As long as there is some positive probability of Xc ::::; Yp when xP = :X, so that the court 
might leave the burden of CP on the plaintiff in the marginal suit, then the plaintiff's expected 
payoff will be strictly decreasing in cp. 
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the constraint Yp ;;:::: x, so that the defendant would pay the plaintiff's 
litigation costs only if the plaintiff prevails. The fee-shifting rule can be 
no more pro-plaintiff than the classic pro-plaintiff rule. The rule in Propo-
sition 1, however, can offer optimal incentives to the plaintiff consistent 
with this constraint if and only if C/(CP + D) :5 eP. If instead 
C/(Cp + D)> eP' (8) 
then the constraint will be costly. The best rule consistent with the con-
straint would be the classic pro-plaintiff rule, under which a plaintiff 
would sue if and only if xP > s*, where s* is defined by equation (6). If 
condition (8) holds, then equation (6) implies that s* > x: plaintiffs that 
are not sufficiently confident of victory will fail to bring some meritorious 
suits. 
B. Excessive Incentive to Litigate under the American Rule 
If C/D < eP, then the American rule leads to excessive litigation. The 
American rule encourages all meritorious suits but also encourages some 
frivolous suits. In this case, pro-defendant fee shifting can improve the 
plaintiff's incentives to sue: 
PROPOSITION 2. If C/D < 6P' then the best one-sided fee-shifting rule 
would provide for pro-defendant fee shifting. Specifically: 
a) If eP :5 (CP + Cd)/D, then the best one-sided fee-shifting rule would 
specify that the plaintiff pays the defendant's litigation costs if xc :5 Yct, 
where 
(9) 
In these cases, this rule would create the optimal incentives for the plain-
tiff to bring suit. 
b) If8P > (CP + Cd)/D, then the best one-sided fee-shifting rule would 
specify that the plaintiff pays the defendant's litigation costs if xc :5 Yct, 
where y d ;;:::: x + e 2 • This rule would fall short of producing optimal results 
only insofar as it will fail to discourage all frivolous suits. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Intuition. Note that if litigation costs are sufficiently small relative to 
the amount at stake, so that 
(10) 
then no fee-shifting rule can provide optimal incentives for the plaintiff. 
In this case, even in the marginal case (in which xP = x), the plaintiff's 
expected payoff from trial would exceed the litigation costs of both par-
ties. Even if the plaintiff were certain that it would have to pay the fees 
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of both parties, these costs would not deter the plaintiff from bringing 
such a suit. In such cases, fee shifting is an inadequate sanction to deter 
all frivolous suits. 
Comparative Statics. Note that the plaintiff's expected payoff from 
bringing the marginal suit is strictly increasing in eP and D but strictly 
decreasing in CP. Furthermore, as long as 0 < FCy ct - x) < 1, this payoff 
will strictly decrease in y ct and C d. 12 Thus, as long as the fee-shifting rule 
sets Yct to optimize the plaintiff's incentives to bring suit such that x -
e 1 < Yct < x + e2 , the optimal Yct will strictly increase in eP and D but 
strictly decrease in C P and C ct. 
That is, ceteris paribus, the optimal policy becomes more pro-
defendant if either eP or D increases but more pro-plaintiff if CP or Cct 
increases. If the award that the plaintiff expects to recover increases, 
then the optimal rule-to offset the increased incentive to bring suit-
must increase the probability that the plaintiff would have to bear the 
defendant's litigation costs. If, on the other hand, either the plaintiff's or 
the defendant's litigation costs increase, then the optimal rule-to offset 
the reduced incentive to bring suit-must decrease the probability that 
the plaintiff would have to bear the defendant's litigation costs. 
Comparison with the Classic Pro-Defendant Rule. As we saw in Sec-
tion IIIB, the classic pro-defendant rule, which imposes the constraint 
Yct = x, is optimal if and only if eP = (Cp + Cct)I(D + Cct). In this 
section, we see that if CP/D < eP < (CP + Cct)I(D + Cct), then the classic 
pro-defendant rule leads to too little litigation, and the best rule instead 
sets y ct lower than x. In order to trigger pro-defendant fee shifting under 
the best rule, the defendant must not only win its case but also win by a 
sufficiently wide margin. If (CP + Cct)/(D + Cct) < eP instead, then the 
classic pro-defendant rule leads to too much litigation, and y ct > x is 
necessary to reduce the plaintiff's incentives. The best fee-shifting rule 
in these cases is even more pro-defendant than the classic pro-defendant 
fee-shifting rule: the defendant wins reimbursement not only when it wins 
its case, but also when it loses its case by a sufficiently small margin. 
Fee Shifting in Favor of Winning Defendants Only. Suppose we im-
pose the constraint Yct :5 x, so that the plaintiff would pay the defendant's 
litigation costs only if the defendant prevails. The fee-shifting rule can 
be no more pro-defendant than the classic pro-defendant rule. The rule 
in Proposition 2, however, can offer optimal incentives to the plaintiff 
consistent with this constraint if and only if C/D < eP :5 (CP + Cct)I(D 
12 As long as there is some positive probability that xc :5 Yd when xP = :X, so that the 
court might place the burden of Cd on the plaintiff in the marginal suit, then the plaintiff's 
expected payoff will be strictly decreasing in cd. 
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+ Cd). If instead 
(11) 
then the constraint y d :5 x will be costly. The best rule consistent with 
the constraint would be the classic pro-defendant rule, under which a 
plaintiff would sue if and only if xP > s*, where s* is defined by equation 
(5). If condition (11) holds, then equation (5) implies that s* < x: plaintiffs 
that are not sufficiently convinced of defeat will bring some frivolous 
suits. 
C. Example with a Uniform Distribution 
A simple example provides a useful illustration of our results. Suppose 
for simplicity that E is uniformly distributed in the interval (- e, e), for 
some ~ > 0. In this special case, 
F(E) = 1h(l + Ele), 
and eP = 1h. Solving (12) for the inverse function, we find 
p- 1(p) = (2p- l)e 
(12) 
(13) 
for p in the interval (0, 1). Using this particular inverse function in (7) 
and (9), we can derive the optimal fee-shifting rules. 
Proposition 2(a) implies that if CP/D < 1h < (CP + Cd)ID, then the 
optimal rule specifies that the plaintiff pays the defendant's litigation 
costs if xc :5 y d, where 
(14) 
This rule operates only against losing plaintiffs (that is, y d :5 :X) if and 
only if D :5 2 C P + C d. Note that y d is increasing in D but decreasing in 
CP and Cct. Proposition 2(b) implies that if (CP + Cct)ID < 1h instead, 
then y d ~ x + e. Finally, Proposition 1 implies that if 1h < C / D instead, 
then the optimal rule would specify that the defendant pays the plaintiff's 
litigation costs if xc < y P, where 
Yp = x + (D- CP)e/CP. (15) 
This rule operates only against losing defendants (that is, Yp ~ x) if and 
only if C P :::; D. Note that y P is increasing in D but decreasing in C P. 
v. THE FAMILy OF OPTIMAL FEE-SHIFTING RULES 
In this section, we examine the possibility of fee-shifting rules under 
which, even for a given D, F(E), CP' and Cd, the court may require either 
side to reimburse the other for its litigation costs. That is, we do not 
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require either Yp = oo or Yct = - oo to hold; instead, we can allow both 
y P and y d to be finite for the same set of cases. We will consider how to 
design the best two-sided fee-shifting rule. We analyze the best two-sided 
rule to see if it performs any better than the best one-sided rule, and as 
we will see, it does not. We also study two-sided fee-shifting rules be-
cause Rule 11 is an example of such a rule. Our analysis of how best to 
design such a rule will shed light on the use of fee shifting under Rule 
11. 
It will be helpful in this analysis to distinguish between the case in 
which eP ::; (Cp + Cct)ID and the case in which eP > (Cp + Cct)ID. In 
the first case, fee shifting can produce the optimal incentives for plaintiffs 
to bring suit. In the second case, we will see that it cannot. 
A. The Case in Which Fee Shifting Can Produce Optimal Results 
Let us look first at the case in which condition (1 0) does not hold: 
eP ::; (CP + Cct)ID. In this case, if the plaintiff must always bear the 
litigation costs of both sides, then all frivolous suits would be discour-
aged. The probability of error in favor of the plaintiff would not be suffi-
cient to induce the plaintiff to bear these costs. Thus, in this case one 
could conceive of a fee-shifting rule that would deter all frivolous suits. 
In fact, we find that there exists a whole family of two-sided fee-shifting 
rules that can ensure that the plaintiff brings suit if and only if the case 
is sufficiently strong: 
PROPOSITION 3. If eP ::; (Cp + Cct)ID, then there exists a family of 
two-sided fee-shifting rules that would create the optimal incentives for 
the plaintiff to bring suit. Each such rule would specify that the defendant 
pays the plaintiff's expenses if xc > Yp and that the plaintiff pays the 
defendant's expenses if xc::; :Yct, where 
-CP + [1- F(yp- :X)]CP- F(:Yct- :X)Cct + ePD = 0. (16) 
All of these rules would discourage all frivolous suits and encourage all 
meritorious suits. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Intuition. As long as condition (10) does not hold, there is a one-sided 
fee-shifting rule that would produce optimal incentives for plaintiffs to 
bring suit. The best two-sided fee-shifting rule can produce no better 
results, and as Proposition 3 shows, it produces no worse results. We 
can design a two-sided fee-shifting rule, indeed a whole family of such 
rules, that would produce optimal results. 
The optimal two-sided fee-shifting rule, like the optimal one-sided fee-
shifting rule, ensures that the expected value of going to trial is negative 
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for xP < x, zero for the marginal suit in which xP = x, and positive for 
xP > x. Without fee shifting, the expected value of the marginal suit 
would be - C P + e PD. Fee shifting adds the second and third terms to 
the expression for the expected value of the marginal suit on the left-hand 
side of equation ( 16). Equation ( 16) sets the expected value of the mar-
ginal suit, including the expected net gain (or loss) from fee shifting, equal 
to 0. 
Extreme Thresholds for Fee Shifting. In designing a two-sided fee 
shifting rule, there would never be any reason to set y d < x - e 1 or to 
set Yp > x + e2 • Consider a rule with Yct < x - e 1: there would be no 
reason not to increase y d to x - e 1, because this change would only 
increase the expected costs of frivolous suits; it would not affect meritori-
ous suits. Similarly, if we are considering a rule with y P > x + e 2 , then 
there is no reason not to lower y P to x + e 2 , because this change would 
only reduce the expected costs of meritorious suits; it would not affect 
frivolous suits. Neither of these effects would be undesirable. If the other 
threshold is set optimally, then making either of these changes would be 
unnecessary, because the rule would already discourage all frivolous suits 
and encourage all meritorious suits. If the other threshold is not set opti-
mally, however, then these changes might be desirable. 
Fee Shifting to Encourage Suits. Suppose CP > ePD, so that there is 
an insufficient incentive for the plaintiff to bring suit under the American 
rule. In this case, the optimal one-sided fee-shifting rule provided for 
pro-plaintiff fee shifting and ruled out any pro-defendant fee shifting. That 
is, it set y d = - oo. Note that with the optimal two-sided fee-shifting rule, 
as long as y d > x - e 1 , so that there is some probability of pro-defendant 
fee shifting in the marginal case, we must increase the probability of 
pro-plaintiff fee shifting above what it would be under the optimal one-
sided fee-shifting rule. 
Note also that the sum of the second and third terms in equation (16) 
must equal CP - ePD. Thus, if CP > ePD, then this sum must be positive. 
If we suppose further that C P = C d, then 1 - F(y P - :X) must exceed 
F(yd - :X). Therefore, under these assumptions, we must set the fee-
shifting thresholds such that the probability of pro-plaintiff fee shifting 
must exceed the probability of pro-defendant fee shifting. For example, 
if y d < x < y P under our rule, and the distribution of E is symmetric about 
0, then Yp must be closer to x than Yct is. 
Fee Shifting to Discourage Suits. Suppose CP < ePD, so that there 
is an excessive incentive for the plaintiff to bring suit under the American 
rule. In this case, the optimal one-sided fee-shifting rule provided for 
pro-defendant fee shifting and ruled out any pro-plaintiff fee shifting. That 
is, it set Yp = oo. Note that with the optimal two-sided fee-shifting rule, 
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as long as Yp <:X + e2 , so that there is some probability of pro-plaintiff 
fee shifting in the marginal case, we must increase the probability of 
pro-defendant fee shifting above what it would be under the optimal one-
sided fee-shifting rule. 
Note also that if CP < 6PD, then the sum of the second and third terms 
in equation (16) must be negative. If we suppose further that CP = Cd, 
then F(yd - x) must exceed 1 - F(yp - x). Therefore, under these 
assumptions, we must set the fee-shifting thresholds such that the proba-
bility of pro-defendant fee shifting exceeds the probability of pro-plaintiff 
fee shifting. For example, ifyd <:X< Yp under our rule, and the distribu-
tion of e is symmetric about 0, then Yd must be closer to :X than Yp is. 
Comparative Statics. Note that the plaintiff's expected payoff from 
bringing the marginal suit is monotonically increasing in 6P and D. Fur-
thermore, as long as both 0 < F(yd - :X) < 1 and 0 < F(yp - :X) < 1, 
this payoff will strictly decrease in yd, Yp' Cd, and CP. 13 Thus, if the 
fee-shifting rule sets both thresholds, y d and y P, to optimize the plaintiff's 
incentives to bring suit such that :X - e 1 < Yd <:X + e2 and :X - e 1 < Yp 
<:X + e2 , then each threshold-holding the other constant-will increase 
in 6P and D but decrease in Cd and CP. 
That is, ceteris paribus, the optimal policy becomes more pro-
defendant if either 6P or D increases but more pro-plaintiff if either Cd or 
CP increases. If the award that the plaintiff expects to recover increases, 
then the optimal rule-to offset the increased incentive to bring suit-
must increase the probability that the plaintiff would have to bear the 
parties' litigation costs. If, on the other hand, these litigation costs in-
crease, then the optimal rule-to offset the reduced incentive to bring 
suit-must decrease the probability that the plaintiff would have to bear 
them. 
B. The Case in Which Fee Shifting Cannot Produce Optimal Results 
Consider the case in which condition (10) holds. If 6P > (CP + Cd)ID, 
then we cannot discourage all frivolous suits, even if the plaintiff must 
always bear the litigation costs of both sides. The probability of error in 
favor of the plaintiff would be sufficient to induce the plaintiff to bear 
these costs in the marginal case: the plaintiff still anticipates positive 
13 As long as the court threatens to impose both Cd and CP on the plaintiff in the marginal 
suit, its payoff will decrease in both parameters. In particular, if there is some positive 
probability of Xc :S Yd when Xp = X, then this payoff will be strictly decreasing in cd. 
Similarly, if there is some positive probability of Xc :S Yp when xP = x, then this payoff will 
be strictly decreasing in cp also. 
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expected value from going to trial. Thus, in this case there is no fee-
shifting rule that would deter all frivolous suits. 
PROPOSITION 4. If 8P > (Cp + Cd)/D, then the best two-sided fee-
shifting rule would specify that the plaintiff pays the defendant's expenses 
if xc 5; Yd and that the defendant pays the plaintiff's expenses if xc > Yp• 
where y d :2: x + e 2 and y P :2: x + e 2 • Under this rule, however, the 
plaintiff would still have excessive incentives to bring suit. 
Remark. If condition (10) holds, then the best one-sided fee-shifting 
rule would set y d to ensure that the plaintiff with the marginal case (or 
any worse case) would always bear the defendant's litigation costs. The 
best two-sided fee-shifting rule does the same and also sets y P such that 
the defendant would never have to pay the plaintiff's litigation costs in 
a marginal case (or in any worse case). This rule would be the best 
two-sided fee-shifting rule in that it maximizes the achievement of each 
objective: this rule would encourage all meritorious suits and discourage 
as many frivolous suits as possible. This rule would fall short of producing 
optimal results insofar as it will fail to discourage all frivolous suits. 
C. Fee Shifting Subject to Constraints on y P andy d 
Each of the classic fee-shifting rules is a special restricted case of the 
more general two-sided fee-shifting rule, with (y d, y P) constrained to take 
on a particular pair of values: (- oo, oo) for the American rule; (:X, :X) for 
the British rule; (- oo, :X) for the pro-plaintiff rule; and (:X, oo) for the 
pro-defendant rule. As we have seen, these constrained rules provide 
optimal incentives only in very special circumstances. Similarly, con-
straints such as y d 5; x or y P :2: x would also restrict the circumstances 
under which the two-sided fee-shifting rule could provide optimal incen-
tives. These restrictions, however, prove to be less severe than those 
imposed by the classic fee-shifting rules. 
The constraint Yp :2: :X, for example, would imply that the fee-shifting 
rule can be no more pro-plaintiff than the classic pro-plaintiff rule. Recall 
that even the classic pro-plaintiff rule leads to too little litigation if and 
only if condition (8) holds. Thus, fee shifting subject to the constraint 
y P :2: x can provide optimal incentives if and only if the opposite condition 
holds, which we can express as 
(17) 
Condition (17) states that in the marginal case, the plaintiff's expected 
gain from adjudication must at least equal its expected liability for its 
litigation costs under the pro-plaintiff rule. 
If the plaintiff's litigation costs are too great relative to the amount at 
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stake, then (8) rather than (17) holds. Then even under the pro-plaintiff 
rule, plaintiffs sue if and only if xP > s*, where s* is defined by equation 
(6). As discussed in Section IV A, condition (8) implies s* > x, so that 
plaintiffs fail to bring some meritorious cases because they are sufficiently 
close cases and the risk of losing is too great. 
Similarly, the constraint y d :::::; x would imply that the fee-shifting rule 
can be no more pro-defendant than the classic pro-defendant rule. Recall 
that even the classic pro-defendant rule leads to too much litigation if and 
only if condition (11) holds. Thus, fee shifting subject to the constraint Yct 
:::::; x can provide optimal incentives if and only if the opposite condition 
holds, which we can express as 
epD:::::; cp + cded. (18) 
Condition (18) states that in the marginal case, the plaintiff's expected 
gain from adjudication cannot exceed its expected liability for litigation 
costs under the pro-defendant rule. 
If litigation costs are too small relative to the amount at stake, then 
(11) rather than (18) holds. Then as discussed in Section IV B, condition 
(11) implies that the s* defined by equation (5) is less than :X. Thus, even 
under the pro-defendant rule, plaintiffs bring some frivolous suits where 
xP > s*, because they are sufficiently close cases and the possibility of 
winning is great enough to make the effort worthwhile. 
D. Example with a Uniform Distribution 
Suppose again for simplicity that e is uniformly distributed in the inter-
val (- e, e). As long as condition (10) does not hold, we can use the 
F(e) in (12) to derive the family of optimal rules for this example. After 
rearranging terms, we find that Proposition 3 and (12) together imply that 
if 1h :::::; ( C P + C d)/ D, then the optimal rule ensures that 
yPCP + :YctCct = (D - CP- Cct)e + (Cp + Cct):X, (19) 
where Yp and Yct both lie in the interval (:X - e, x + e). 14 Solving (19) for 
Yp yields 
Yp = x + [(D - CP- Cct)e - (Yct - :X)Cctl/CP, (20) 
and solving (19) for y d yields 
Yct = x + [(D - CP- Cct)e - (yP- x)CP]/Cct· (21) 
Note that this example reveals another comparative statics result: the 
effect of an increase in the uncertainty of the trial outcome has an ambigu-
14 Proposition 4 implies that if (CP + Cd)/D < 'h instead, then Yct 2': x + e and Yp 2': 
x +e. 
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ous effect on the (Yct• Yp) locus. An increase in e may move the locus to 
higher values of Yp and Yct or to lower values, depending on whether D 
is greater or less than cp + cd. 
VI. EXTENSIONS 
A. Plaintiff Uncertainty Regarding x 
An important element in the analysis is the presence of legal uncer-
tainty: the plaintiff may be uncertain about the outcome of a trial. One 
source of such uncertainty, and the one we have used for concreteness 
in our model, is the possibility of an erroneous decision by the court: 
even if the plaintiff can observe the "true merit" of its case, the court 
might not observe the "true merit" accurately, and the plaintiff cannot 
completely predict the court's error. A second possible source of uncer-
tainty is the possibility of an erroneous evaluation by the plaintiff: the 
plaintiff might be uncertain about the "true merit" of its own case. 
Until now we have not considered this second possibility: we have 
assumed that xP = x. We can assume instead that not only the court but 
also the plaintiff observes x, the "true merit" of the case, with error. 
Specifically, let xP = x + EP and Xc = x + Ec, with both EP and Ec as 
random variables. In this case, xc = xP + e, as before, where now e = 
Ec - eP. The model yields the same results as before, with the random 
variable e now reinterpreted to represent the difference between the 
court's error and the plaintiff's error. 
As this discussion suggests, in fact, it is not important for our results 
whether any "true" value of x exists at all. Although we have assumed 
that there is a "true" value for x, we can also give our framework an 
interpretation under which there is no "true" x. Instead, there is only 
what the court will determine x to be, x c, and the plaintiff's expectation 
as to what the court's determination will be. In this case, let xP denote 
the expected value attached by the plaintiff to xc. The plaintiff knows 
only that xc = xP + e, where e is distributed according to F(e), and the 
analysis proceeds as before. 
B. Other Social Objectives: Different Thresholds for Desirable Suits 
In the preceding analysis, we have assumed that x*, the threshold that 
xP must exceed for a suit to be socially desirable, equals :X. That is, we 
took the policy goal to be to induce the plaintiff to sue if and only if it 
observes xP greater than :X. We can, however, allow for x* other than :X. 
A threshold different from x is especially plausible once we consider 
plaintiffs that observe x only with error. Suppose that xP = x + eP, where 
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eP is distributed symmetrically about 0. In this case, setting x* = x implies 
that plaintiffs should sue if and only if they believe that the probability 
of x > x is at least 50 percent. One can just as easily consider a policy 
that would require plaintiffs to sue with a confidence level greater than 
50 percent or a confidence level lower than 50 percent. 
For example, courts may identify a class of suits that society would 
not want to discourage even though the plaintiffs regard their claims as 
unlikely to succeed. There may be some public good flowing from these 
suits, even if plaintiffs estimate that their likelihood of success is substan-
tially less than 50 percent. A suit may be unlikely to succeed, for exam-
ple, because it relies on innovative legal theories that promote the devel-
opment of legal doctrines. In terms of our model, if a suit is likely to fall 
short of success on this particular ground, courts may set x* < x to 
encourage such litigation. That is, to the extent that any other social 
objective militates in favor of plaintiffs bringing some particular types of 
lawsuits, a more pro-plaintiff policy would be appropriate. 15 
This extension requires only minor modifications in the preceding anal-
ysis. Again, we would set Yp or Yct (or both) so that the expected value 
for the plaintiff of going to trial with the marginal suit is 0, but now we 
regard the case in which xP = x* (rather than xP = x) to be the marginal 
suit. Thus, x* would replace x where appropriate. The plaintiff is still 
indifferent about bringing the marginal suit, but we have changed the 
probability of success of the marginal suit. Thus, such an extension would 
still preserve the general thrust of our results. 
A lower x* implies a lower expected value for the marginal suit in the 
absence of fee shifting. If we reduce x*, then we are more likely to 
15 The optimal threshold x* should ultimately be derived in a comprehensive normative 
analysis that would consider how the magnitude and the allocation of litigation costs would 
affect the defendant's incentives ex ante. See Keith N. Hylton, The Influence of Litigation 
Costs on Deterrence under Strict Liability and under Negligence, 10 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 
161 (1990); Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance with the 
Negligence Standard, 22 J. Legal Stud. 457 (1993); Ivan P. L. P'ng, Litigation, Liability, 
and Incentives for Care, 34 J. Pub. Econ. 61 (1987). This analysis would also seek to reduce 
total litigation costs. See Polinsky & Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits, supra note 3; 
Polinsky & Rubinfeld, Optimal Awards, supra note 3. The goal of optimal fee-shifting rules 
would be to align the plaintiff's private incentives to bring a suit with the net social benefits 
of that suit. See Steven Shavell, The Social versus Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a 
Costly Legal System, 11 J. Legal Stud. 333 (1982). Nevertheless, because stronger cases 
would be more likely to contribute to our social objectives than weaker cases, it seems 
plausible in any event that plaintiffs with sufficiently strong cases should sue whereas 
plaintiffs with sufficiently weak cases should not. Therefore, we believe that our framework, 
which determines how to induce plaintiffs to sue if and only if they believe their cases to 
be sufficiently strong, is of general interest. 
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have an inadequate incentive to sue (and less likely to have an excessive 
incentive to sue) in the absence of fee shifting. Thus, a reduction in x* 
implies that the best fee-shifting rule is more pro-plaintiff: it is more likely 
to put the burden of litigation costs on the defendant, with a lower y P or 
Yct (or a set of lower Yp and Yct values). 16 
C. Policy Instruments Other than Fee Shifting 
Thus far, we have assumed that the court can impose only fee shifting 
as a sanction. The court simply sets the thresholds that will trigger fee 
shifting. More generally, as already suggested, one could also make the 
size of the sanction a policy variable. That is, one could imagine rules 
under which the defendant pays the plaintiff SP if xc > Yp and the plaintiff 
pays the defendant S d if xc ~ yd. Even more generally, you could have 
the net transfer S from defendant to plaintiff be a nondecreasing function 
of xc. In that case, the plaintiff's expected payoff from litigation still 
increases monotonically in xP. The basic approach of this article still 
applies: the court can set the function S(xc) such that the plaintiff is just 
indifferent about bringing the marginal suit but willing to bring better 
suits and unwilling to bring worse suits. 
Given that the absolute value of S(xc) can be raised over the level of 
reimbursement for litigation costs, it should always be possible to induce 
optimal decisions, even if the court can impose sanctions only on the 
losing party. For example, in the case discussed in Section V C in which 
condition (17) fails to hold, we would have to supplement or replace fee 
shifting subject to the constraint y P 2:: x with other policies in order to 
induce plaintiffs to bring suit in all appropriate cases. Courts might pro-
vide for additional awards in some cases to induce plaintiffs to bring 
meritorious suits that they would otherwise not bring because of high 
litigation costs. That is, we can increase the expected value of the plain-
tiff's suit by shifting the S(xc) function up. 17 
If a court may impose sanctions paid by the defendant to the plaintiff 
in excess of the plaintiff's attorney's fees, then courts could use this 
16 Conversely, a higher x* implies a more pro-defendant rule. A higher x* implies a higher 
expected value for the marginal suit in the absence of fee shifting. If we raise x*, then we 
are more likely to have an excessive incentive to sue (and less likely to have an inadequate 
incentive to sue) in the absence of fee shifting. Thus, an increase in x* implies that the best 
fee-shifting rule is less pro-plaintiff: it is more likely to put the burden of litigation costs on 
the plaintiff, with a higher Yp or Yd (or a set of higher Yp and Yd values). 
17 Similarly, if condition (18) fails to hold, then we would have to supplement or replace 
fee shifting subject to the constraint y d ::5 x with other policies in order to discourage 
plaintiffs from bringing any frivolous suits. Specifically, we can decrease the expected value 
of the plaintiff's suit by shifting the S(xc) function down. 
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authority to encourage plaintiffs to bring suit. There are also other policy 
instruments, however, that can shift the S(xJ function. Suppose for ex-
ample that a court is more likely to award punitive damages in a tort case 
if it finds that the defendant was grossly negligent. In this case, the ex-
pected damages anticipated by the plaintiff will depend on the plaintiff's 
observed xP' because the amount awarded upon a finding of liability will 
be correlated with the court's findings on x. By increasing the punitive 
damages or awarding them more readily, courts could shift the S(xc) 
function up. Or we could provide for treble damages in a particular cate-
gory of cases to increase the amount recovered, so that condition (17) 
can hold. 
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR RULE I I 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires an attorney (or a party not 
represented by an attorney) to sign pleadings, motions, and other papers 
before filing them in court, thereby certifying that to the best of that 
person's knowledge after a reasonable inquiry the paper has not been 
presented "for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause un-
necessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation," is "war-
ranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law,'' and is well grounded in fact. 18 
If a court determines that an attorney or party has violated this rule, the 
court, on motion or on its own initiative, shall impose on that person "an 
appropriate sanction,'' which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the expenses incurred as a result of the 
violation, including reasonable attorneys' fees. 
For example, if the plaintiff's case is so frivolous that the court finds 
that the plaintiff's attorney should have known the suit was without merit 
when filed, the rule allows the court to shift the burden of the defendant's 
fees to the plaintiff. In enforcing Rule 11, courts have often focused 
on the merits of claims and defenses in this way. Furthermore, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases imposing sanctions under Rule 11, courts 
have punished the party filing the ''frivolous'' paper by awarding costs 
and fees to the opposing party. 19 Thus, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit has stated that "Rule 11 is a fee-shifting statute. " 2° Crit-
18 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms 16-17 (transmitted 
to Congress on April 22, 1993) (hereinafter 1993 Amendments), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 
405, 420-21 (1993). 
19 See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" 
Problems in the Struggle between Compensation and Punishment, 74 Geo. L. J. 1313, 1333 
(1986). 
20 Hays v. Sony Corp., 847 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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ics of this interpretation of Rule 11, however, warn against routine use 
of expense shifting as a sanction. 21 In response to this criticism, the au-
thors of the 1993 amendments modified the rule so that Rule 11(c)(2) now 
states that the court may order payment of ''some or all of the reasonable 
attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the viola-
tion" if such cost-shifting is "warranted for effective deterrence. " 22 
Our analysis sheds light on how courts can best use Rule 11 to deter 
frivolous suits while encouraging meritorious suits. Although courts com-
monly use fee shifting as a Rule 11 sanction, they can also use other 
sanctions. We will first assume that fee shifting is the Rule 11 sanction 
and examine the determination of the appropriate thresholds for fee shift-
ing. We will then comment on circumstances in which fee shifting will 
be inadequate and other sanctions are necessary. 
A. The Threshold for Fee Shifting 
Let us suppose that courts will use fee shifting as the Rule 11 sanction. 
Within our framework, Rule 11 is a two-sided fee-shifting rule, because 
it allows for the possibility of fee shifting in either direction in each case. 
Our analysis sheds light on how the thresholds for fee shifting should be 
21 Burbank, for example, argues that courts should exercise greater discretion in selecting 
a sanction sufficient to deter in the particular circumstances of the case. See Stephen B. 
Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1925 (1989). 
22 1993 Amendments at 19, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 423. The authors of the 1993 
amendments to Rule 11 concluded that the rule had "too rarely been enforced through 
nonmonetary sanctions" and "cost-shifting ... has too frequently been selected as the 
sanction." Attachment B to letter from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules to Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure 3-4 (May 1, 1992) (hereinafter Attachment B), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 521, 
523-24 (1993). Consequently, the authors sought to emphasize deterrence as the goal of 
Rule 11 and to discourage reliance on monetary sanctions, especially fee shifting. 
The model in this article, however, indicates that tailoring the deterrent effect of Rule 
11 sanctions is more complicated given the existence of uncertainty over trial outcomes. If 
courts cannot observe xP, then they cannot know how likely the plaintiff thought its suit 
was to succeed at trial. Given this uncertainty, a court cannot tailor the sanction in any 
particular case to that level just sufficient to deter that particular plaintiff. The deterrent 
effect on any particular plaintiff is also a function of all the other sanctions that the plaintiff 
considered possible. That is, this deterrent effect depends not only on the sanction imposed 
in any particular case, as the court views the case, but also on what sanctions the court 
would impose if it viewed the case differently-that is, if it observed a different xc. 
Viewed in this light, fee shifting can be more flexible and more useful "for effective 
deterrence" than implied by the Advisory Committee. Our analysis suggests how courts 
can control Rule 11 's deterrent effect not only by varying the magnitude of the sanctions 
but also by varying the thresholds that will trigger the sanctions. That is, this article suggests 
that courts can tailor the deterrent effect to the particular circumstances of the case by 
choosing the conditions under which sanctions would be imposed, not necessarily by ad-
justing the severity of the sanctions. 
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set. Given particular definitions of frivolous and meritorious suits, we 
have shown how the optimal thresholds would depend on the various 
parameters involved. 
Given enough information on F(e), for example, there may be cases 
where fee shifting would obviously be appropriate. Whenever the plaintiff 
wins by such a large margin that there is no chance that the plaintiff has 
brought a frivolous suit but won through judicial error, then the defendant 
should pay the plaintiff's litigation costs. This fee-shifting policy might 
encourage meritorious suits that would not otherwise be brought, and it 
would not encourage any frivolous suits. Similarly, whenever the defen-
dant wins by such a large margin that there is no chance that the plaintiff 
has brought a meritorious suit but lost through judicial error, then the 
plaintiff should pay the defendant's litigation costs. This fee-shifting pol-
icy might discourage such frivolous suits, and it would not discourage 
any meritorious suits. 
We have seen, however, that it may well be desirable to shift fees in 
a larger set of cases. In particular, a court might inquire whether there 
is, in the absence of such fee shifting, either insufficient or excessive 
incentives for the plaintiff to bring suit. To this end, the court would need 
to determine the expected value for the plaintiff of going to trial with the 
marginal case. This expected value depends on the plaintiff's litigation 
costs, the amount at stake, and the likelihood of judicial error on the 
merits in either direction. 23 If this expected value is negative, then the 
plaintiff has insufficient incentives to sue; if this expected value is posi-
tive, then the plaintiff has excessive incentives to sue. 
If there is an insufficient incentive to sue in the absence of fee shifting, 
then the ideal fee-shifting rule would offer the plaintiff a net expected 
gain in the marginal case. That is, the thresholds should be set in such a 
way that the expected pro-plaintiff fee shifting would exceed the expected 
pro-defendant fee shifting. If the plaintiff's and defendant's litigation 
costs are similar, then the thresholds should imply that the likelihood 
of pro-plaintiff fee shifting exceeds the likelihood of pro-defendant fee 
shifting. 24 
23 To set precisely the best thresholds for fee shifting requires more information than 
courts are likely to have in reality. Nevertheless, our analysis suggests at least some crude 
rules of thumb. Although courts would not be able to implement perfectly the best fee-
shifting rule, they should be able to achieve roughly the desired effect on plaintiffs' incen-
tives. They may shift fees in some cases in which the best rule would not and fail to shift 
fees in some cases in which the best rule would call for it. Unless one type of departure 
from the best rule predominates, however, the two types of error in fee-shifting decisions 
would tend to offset one another. Such random errors-without systematic bias-would 
have little net effect on the plaintiff's expected value from bringing suit. 
24 Thus, the thresholds should be set so as to favor the plaintiff: if errors are distributed 
symmetrically about zero and litigation costs are similar, then the threshold for pro-plaintiff 
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In contrast, if there is an excessive incentive to sue in the absence of 
fee shifting, then the ideal fee-shifting rule would impose a net expected 
cost on the plaintiff in the marginal case. That is, the thresholds should 
be set in such a way that the expected pro-defendant fee shifting would 
exceed the expected pro-plaintiff fee shifting. If the plaintiff's and defen-
dant's litigation costs are similar, then the thresholds should imply that 
the likelihood of pro-defendant fee shifting exceeds the likelihood of pro-
plaintiff fee shifting. 25 
In any case, the comparative statics results in Section VA offer some 
further guidance for courts exercising the discretion that they enjoy under 
Rule 11. These results suggest that courts should give Rule 11 an interpre-
tation more generous to plaintiffs in cases in which the litigation costs 
are larger relative to the amount at stake. As Section VA indicates, this 
interpretation may mean that courts use Rule 11 more sparingly against 
plaintiffs, or that they use it more aggressively against defendants, or 
both. Conversely, if the amount at stake is larger relative to the litigation 
costs, then courts should invoke Rule 11 more readily against plaintiffs 
and less frequently against defendants. 
We have assumed that the plaintiff is risk neutral. Given a risk-averse 
plaintiff, an increase in risk would magnify the deterrent effect of any 
given fee-shifting rule. This effect suggests that courts should give Rule 
11 a more pro-plaintiff interpretation in the face of greater legal uncer-
tainty or when dealing with particularly risk-averse plaintiffs. Thus, it 
may be appropriate for courts to afford more favorable treatment under 
Rule 11 to plaintiffs that bring suit in unsettled areas of the law or those 
with lower levels of wealth because more pro-plaintiff thresholds would 
be necessary to achieve a given deterrent effect. 26 
We may also want to vary our fee-shifting thresholds because we wish 
to deter some suits more than others even if they are equally unlikely to 
win on the merits. 27 That is, we may believe some suits are socially 
fee shifting should be closer to the standard for liability than the threshold for pro-defendant 
fee shifting is. 
25 Thus, the thresholds should be set so as to favor the defendant: if errors are distributed 
symmetrically about zero and litigation costs are similar, then the threshold for pro-
defendant fee shifting should be closer to the standard for liability than the threshold for 
pro-plaintiff fee shifting is. 
26 To put this suggestion in the language of Rule 11, in unsettled areas of the law, more 
lawsuits will be "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law." Furthermore, the Advisory Committee identified 
"cases involving litigants with greatly disparate financial resources" as examples of cases 
"in which cost-shifting may be needed for effective deterrence." Attachment B at 4, re-
printed in 146 F.R.D. at 524. The committee presumably intended to endorse cost shifting 
in favor of the party with fewer resources. 
27 For example, fee shifting might be more pro-defendant if the plaintiff's attorney failed 
to conduct a reasonable prefiling inquiry into the merits of the suit. Schwarzer argues that 
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desirable even if the plaintiff has a relatively low probability of winning. 
If we wish plaintiffs to bring such suits even when they have little confi-
dence of success, then we would need to set more pro-plaintiff thresholds 
in such cases. Controversy over Rule 11 focuses on the risk that sanctions 
will discourage the use of innovative legal theories that produce important 
social benefits. 28 Courts can respond to these concerns by allowing an 
attorney greater leeway in making a losing argument when it is a novel 
"argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law," 
in the language of Rule 11.29 The optimal thresholds will depend in this 
way on the social benefits and costs of the type of suit in question. 30 
courts should shift their scrutiny in Rule 11 cases from the merits of the case to the adequacy 
of the attorney's prefiling inquiry. See William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1013 (1988). Schwarzer argues that such a shift from the merits to the attorney's 
conduct would promote more predictable and less costly enforcement of Rule 11, because 
it is difficult to predict whether a court will find a particular paper "frivolous." See Sanford 
Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All? 24 Osgoode Hall 
L. J. 353 (1986). As we have seen, however, attorneys do not need to predict sanctions 
with certainty for Rule 11 to exert the desired deterrent effect. Instead, in our framework, 
we might set more demanding thresholds for a plaintiff bringing suit without conducting an 
adequate inquiry (than we do for a plaintiff filing the same suit after an inquiry), even 
though such a derelict plaintiff would predict the trial outcome with greater error, simply 
because we wish to deter such behavior. The prefiling inquiry is socially desirable because 
it might have revealed that the case was without merit. 
28 See Nelken, supra note 19; Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 
11 Sanctions, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1987). 
29 Wilder argues that courts have in fact been sensitive to the chilling effect of sanctions 
and have used Rule 11 cautiously. See Nancy H. Wilder, The 1983 Amendments to Rule 
11: Answering the Critics' Concern with Judicial Self-Restraint, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
798 (1986). 
30 The optimal thresholds would also depend on the costs of fee shifting itself. Fee shifting 
may entail additional costs, for example, if parties respond by expending greater resources 
litigating the merits of the case. See Ronald Braeutigam, Bruce Owen & John Panzar, An 
Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 L. & Contemp. Probs. 173 
(1984); John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or, I'll Be Suing You, 18 J. 
Legal Stud. 157 (1989). Furthermore, fee shifting depends on the resolution of issues other 
than the court's determination on the merits. In our framework, a court must determine 
F( e), C d, and C P, as well as the margin of victory, and in practice these issues might be 
costly for the parties and the court to resolve. In fact, critics have often charged that Rule 
11 has generated too much costly "satellite litigation." See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et 
al., Bench-Bar Proposal to Revise Civil Procedure Rule 11, 137 F.R.D. 159, 167 (1991). 
These administrative costs of fee shifting and their effects must also enter the analysis. See 
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, No Armistice at 11: A Commentary on the 
Supreme Court's 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 3 
Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 93 (1993); Polinsky and Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits, supra 
note 3. These costs may militate not only in favor of simpler (but cruder) criteria for fee 
shifting but also in favor of using fee shifting sparingly. Courts might set fee-shifting thresh-
olds so as to trigger fee shifting less frequently, in order both to reduce administrative costs 
and to increase the incentives of the parties to restrain their own expenditures on their 
attorneys' fees. 
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B. The Use of Sanctions Other than Fee Shifting 
Under Rule 11, courts may impose sanctions other than fee shifting, 
such as fines or nonmonetary sanctions. As amended in 1993, Rule 11 
explicitly authorizes "directives of a nonmonetary nature" and "an order 
to pay a penalty into court,'' although these sanctions were also available 
under Rule 11 prior to 1993.31 As we have noted, there is some debate 
over whether fee shifting is too severe a sanction and when courts should 
use other sanctions instead. Our analysis also has implications for this 
question. 
Although the authors of the 1993 amendments apparently believed that 
fee shifting often exceeds what is necessary for adequate deterrence,32 
the analysis in this article suggests that fee shifting need not ever deter 
too many suits. If the courts set the appropriate thresholds for fee shift-
ing, then fee shifting will not lead to excessive deterrence in the sense of 
discouraging any meritorious suits. 33 In fact, the most important short-
coming of reliance on fee shifting alone is that it would be insufficient for 
effective deterrence of all frivolous suits. Our analysis identifies circum-
stances in which fee shifting under Rule 11 would prove to be inadequate 
as a sanction. In these cases, larger sanctions are warranted. Our analysis 
suggests two limitations on the ability of courts to create optimal incen-
tives through the use of Rule 11 as a two-sided fee-shifting device. 
One limitation flows from the inherent limits on the usefulness of fee-
shifting rules in reducing excessive incentives to sue. If the amount at 
stake is sufficiently large relative to litigation costs, then condition (10) 
holds: given the probability of judicial error, the expected gain from 
bringing the marginal case exceeds the litigation costs of both sides. Thus, 
even the prospect of always paying the litigation costs of both sides would 
not discourage all frivolous suits. In these cases, a court would have to 
impose additional penalties in order to discourage these suits. The same 
analysis suggests how in theory courts might increase its sanctions just 
enough to reduce the expected value for the plaintiff of bringing the mar-
ginal suit down to zero. 34 
31 See William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions under the New Federal Rule 11-a Closer Look, 
104 F.R.D. 181, 201-4 (1985). 
32 The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules conceded that "cost-shifting may be needed 
for effective deterrence" in some situations but sought "to emphasize that cost-shifting 
awards should be the exception, rather than the norm, for sanctions." Attachment B at 4, 
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 524. 
33 Fee shifting would still be more than sufficient to deter some frivolous suits, even if 
all meritorious suits have positive expected value for the plaintiff. 
34 Specifically, sufficiently large sanctions would replace the defendant's costs, C d, in 
(10) with some greater penalty such that condition (10) fails to hold. Then this sanction, if 
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There is, however, another limitation on fee shifting under Rule 11. 
Courts generally reserve Rule 11 sanctions for parties that lose by wide 
margins, so that fees are not shifted in favor of a losing party. In terms 
of the model presented in this article, this practice restricts the thresh-
olds, Yp and :Yct, so that Yp < x < Yct· We have seen, however, that given 
these constraints, fee shifting cannot ensure that plaintiffs have optimal 
incentives in all cases, even if litigation costs are large enough relative 
to the amount at stake to ensure condition (10) does not hold. Given this 
limitation, fee shifting under Rule 11 can provide optimal incentives if 
and only if the inequalities in (17) and (18) both hold strictly, that is, if 
and only if 
cped < epv < cp + cded. 
That is, in the marginal case, the plaintiff's expected gain from adjudica-
tion must fall between its expected liability for litigation costs under the 
classic pro-plaintiff rule and its expected liability under the classic pro-
defendant rule. 35 As we have noted, Rule 11 allows for sanctions other 
than the award of attorneys' fees, and these other sanctions may supple-
ment the use of fee shifting. Courts may use these sanctions to address 
the problems that arise when either condition (17) or condition (18) fails 
to hold. 
If litigation costs are too small relative to the amount at stake for 
inequality (18) to hold, then the prospect of Rule 11 fee shifting (subject 
to the constraint y ct ~ x) would be insufficient to deter all frivolous law-
suits, and additional penalties would be appropriate. That is, if the 
amount at stake is sufficiently large relative to litigation costs, so that the 
plaintiff will have excessive incentives to bring suit even under the classic 
pro-defendant rule, then the court would have to impose a larger sanction 
on a losing plaintiff than pro-defendant fee shifting. In such cases, one 
must supplement or replace C ct under such restricted fee shifting with 
some other sanctions for plaintiffs. 36 A sufficiently large sanction could 
reduce the expected value of the marginal suit to zero, so as to provide 
optimal incentives for the plaintiff, even if courts can impose sanctions 
only against losing plaintiffs. 
If instead the plaintiff's litigation costs are so great relative to the 
applied with the appropriate probability, would ensure that the plaintiff would have neither 
too much nor too little incentive to bring suit. 
35 Nevertheless, Rule 11 can provide optimal incentives to the plaintiff over a wider range 
of cases than either the American rule or the British rule, which subject fee shifting to still 
more severe restrictions. 
36 If (18) failed to hold, a court could substitute a greater sanction for Cd in (18) such 
that the inequality in (18) would hold. 
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amount at stake that condition (17) fails to hold, then too little litigation 
results even under the classic pro-plaintiff rule. The authors of Rule 11, 
however, did not focus on this problem and do not explicitly provide 
courts with any instrument to handle these cases. In these cases, our 
analysis suggests that a court should supplement pro-plaintiff fee shifting 
by awarding a winning plaintiff an extra amount. 37 Under Rule 11, a court 
might characterize such an award as a sanction imposed on the defendant 
for a frivolous defense against a meritorious claim by the plaintiff. 
The authors of the most recent amendments to Rule 11, however, did 
not favor such sanctions. The committee notes explain: 
Since the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to compensate, the 
rule provides that, if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be paid 
into court as a penalty. However, under unusual circumstances, . . . deterrence 
may be ineffective unless the sanction not only requires the person violating the 
rule to make a monetary payment, but also directs that some or all of this payment 
be made to those injured by the violation. Accordingly, the rule authorizes the 
court ... to award attorney's fees to another party. Any such award to another 
party, however, should not exceed the expenses and attorneys' fees for the ser-
vices directly and unavoidably caused by the violation .... 38 
To the extent courts follow this approach, sanctions paid to the other 
party under Rule 11 would not go beyond fee shifting. Although our 
analysis would suggest that such sanctions may be useful in inducing 
plaintiffs to bring meritorious suits, the authors of Rule 11 were instead 
solely concerned with deterring frivolous papers. 
VIII. CoNCLUSION 
We have shown that, when plaintiffs cannot predict the outcome of 
litigation with certainty, neither the American rule of litigation cost allo-
cation (under which each litigant bears its own expenses) nor the British 
rule (under which the losing litigant pays the attorneys' fees of the win-
ning litigant) would induce plaintiffs to make optimal decisions to bring 
suit. In particular, plaintiffs may bring frivolous suits when litigation costs 
are sufficiently small relative to the amount at stake, and plaintiffs may 
not bring some meritorious suits when litigation costs are sufficiently 
large relative to the amount at stake. We have analyzed the effects of 
more general fee-shifting rules that are based not only on the identity of 
37 Similarly, Polinsky and Rubinfeld suggest increasing awards to winning plaintiffs to 
encourage those with "legitimate" cases to sue. See Polinsky & Rubinfeld, Sanctioning 
Frivolous Suits, supra note 3; Polinsky & Rubinfeld, Optimal Awards, supra note 3. 
38 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 committee notes, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 587-88 (1993). 
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the winning party but also on how strong the court perceives the case to 
be at the end of the trial-that is, the "margin of victory." In particular, 
we have explored how and when one can design such a rule to induce 
plaintiffs to sue if and only if they believe their cases are sufficiently 
strong. 
Our model shows how courts can use this additional instrument to 
improve the incentives for plaintiffs to bring suit. Our analysis also indi-
cates the factors that courts would consider in deciding whether to shift 
fees if the objective is to induce optimal litigation decisions. We believe 
that this analysis suggests some considerations to guide courts applying 
sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 
APPENDIX 
PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 
Proof of Proposition 1. Under the proposed rule, the plaintiff would sue if 
and only if 
- cp + pr(xc > Yp lxp) cp + pr(xc > xlxp)D > 0. 
Thus, the plaintiff would sue if and only if xP > s*, where s* is defined by 
- CP + [1 - F(YP - s*)] CP + [1 - F(x- s*)]D = 0. (AI) 
Thus, to ensure that s* = x, we must set Yp such that 
-CP + [1- F(yp- x)]CP + ePD = 0. (A2) 
Note that the left-hand side of (A2) is monotonically decreasing in Yp as long as 
0 < F(yp - x) < 1. If we let Yp approach oo, then F(yp - x) goes to 1, so that 
the left-hand side of (A2) must be negative, and plaintiffs would not sue often 
enough. If we let Yp approach - oo, then F(yp - x) goes to 0, so that the left-hand 
side of (A2) must become positive, so that plaintiffs would sue too often. Thus, 
there exists a Yp that solves (A2). Specifically, solving (A2) for Yp yields the 
expression for Yp given in (7). Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Under the proposed rule, the plaintiff would sue if 
and only if 
-(Cp + Cd) + pr(xc > Ydlxp)Cd + pr(xc > xlxp)D > 0. 
Thus, the plaintiff will sue if and only if xP > s*, where s* is defined by 
- (CP + Cd) + [1 - F(yd - s*)] Cd + [1 - F(x - s*)]D = 0. (A3) 
Thus, to ensure that s* = x, we must set y d such that 
(A4) 
Note that the left-hand side of (A4) is monotonically decreasing in y d as long as 
0 < F(y d - x) < 1. If we let y d approach - oo, then F(y d - x) goes to 0, so that 
the left-hand side of (A4) must be positive, and plaintiffs would sue too often. If 
we let Yd approach oo, then F(yd - x) goes to 1. In this case, the left-hand side 
of (A4) becomes nonpositive if and only if the following inequality also holds: 
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epn :5 cp + cd. (A5) 
Thus, there exists a Yct that solves (A4) if and only if (A5) holds; otherwise, there 
would always be too much litigation. Assuming such a Yct exists, solving (A4) for 
Yct yields the expression for Yct given in (9). Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Under the proposed rule, the plaintiff would sue if 
and only if 
-CP + pr(xc>:YPixP)CP- pr(xc:5Yctlxp)Cd + pr(xc>xlxp)D>O. 
Thus, the plaintiff will sue if and only if xP > s*, where s* is defined by 
- CP + [1 - F(YP- s*)] CP- F(yct- s*)Cct + [1 - F(X- s*)]D = 0. (A6) 
Thus, to ensure that s* = x, we must set Yct and Yp such that (16) holds. Note 
that the left-hand side of (16) is monotonically decreasing in Yct as long as 0 < 
F(yd - x) < 1 and in Yp as long as 0 < F(yP - x) < 1. 
If we let both y d and Yp approach oo, then both F(y d - x) and F(yp - x) go 
to 1, so that the left-hand side of (16) must become nonpositive, if and only if 
(A5). holds. If we let both y d and Yp approach - oo, then both F(y d - x) and 
F(yp - x) go to 0. In this case, the left-hand side of (16) must become posi-
tive, and plaintiffs would sue too often. Thus, there exists a pair (yd, Yp) that 
solves (16) if (A5) holds. If (A5) does not hold, then there would always be too 
much litigation. 
If such a solution exists, then there exists a whole family of solutions (y d, Yp). 
We can solve (16) for either Yct or Yp· The solution for Yct may be expressed as a 
monotonically decreasing function of Yp: 
:YctC:Yp) = x + p-Iuepn- F(:Yp- x)cp]/cd}. (A7) 
Similarly, the solution for Yp may be expressed as a monotonically decreasing 
function of y d: 
(A8) 
Thus, as long as both 0 < F(yd - x) < 1 and 0 < F(yP - x) < 1, increases in 
either Yct or Yp would substitute for increases in the other. Q.E.D. 

